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 IMPROVING CLOUD SYSTEM RELIABILITY USING 
AUTONOMOUS AGENT TECHNOLOGY 
ABSTRACT 
Cloud computing platforms provide efficient and flexible ways to offer services 
and computation facilities to users. Service providers acquire resources according to their 
requirements and deploy their services in cloud. Service consumers can access services 
over networks. In cloud computing, virtualization techniques allow cloud providers 
provide computation and storage resources according to users’ requirement. However, 
reliability in the cloud is an important factor to measure the performance of a virtualized 
cloud computing platform. Reliability in cloud computing includes the usability and 
availability. Usability is defined as cloud computing platform provides functional and 
easy-to-use computation resources to users. In order to ensure usability, configurations 
and management policies have to be maintained and deployed by cloud computing 
providers. Availability of cloud is defined as cloud computing platform provides stable 
and reliable computation resources to users. My research concentrates on improving 
usability and availability of cloud computing platforms. I proposed a customized agent-
based reliability monitoring framework to increase reliability of cloud computing. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Problem and Scope 
Cloud computing provides an infrastructure to support efficient and flexible 
computing resource for service providers and service consumers. Cloud is constructed on 
various computer systems over communication networks, which provides computing 
resources through a unified computing platform. Different types of services are provided 
through this unified platform, such as Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service 
(PaaS), Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), etc. These services fulfill service consumers’ 
requirements through unified network interfaces. Service consumers choose services based 
on various needs. Sometimes, a single service can provide enough functionality for 
different service consumers. Sometimes consumers need several services to finish their 
tasks. In this situation, consumers have to integrate these services, and service providers 
need to coordinate with each other. In service coordination, service consumers face 
different issues and problems. These problems are obstacles that stand in the way between 
services and consumers. Therefore, service providers intend to provide services that have 
been integrated to meet consumers’ needs. This makes the nature of cloud computing, 
which provides on-demand and measured services. In a virtualized environment, services 
are usually deployed in virtual machines or shared virtual machines. Virtualization is one 
of the most important technologies in cloud computing, which is used to increase the 
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utilization of physical hardware resources and network bandwidth. Web application 
providers have the potential to scale virtual resources up and down to achieve cost-effective 
outcomes. In such virtualized environment, users cannot tell the difference between 
virtualized computer hardware and physical hardware. Users expect the same capability 
from real physical hardware. Therefore, virtualized systems receive all types of requests 
and commands. These requests and commands are finally passed to the host operating 
system or hypervisor to allocate system resources and perform the computation. Host 
operating systems or hypervisors are foundation of the upper level virtual machines. Events 
happened in virtual machines will affect host operating systems or hypervisors. These 
events may also affect each other in certain ways. 
Regardless of functions and scales of services, service consumers need reliable and 
stable services through service providers. The system reliability is one of the most 
important requirements for cloud service providers. Reliability means proper functioning 
of the system under the full range of conditions experienced in the field [1]. However, the 
definition of reliable service may be different according to different needs. Service 
consumers consider reliability as proper functioning, security, and ease of use. Service 
providers also consider reliability in service creation, deployment, integration and 
separation. The reliability in cloud computing environment also includes providing proper 
functioning in different stages in service lifecycle. Service integration and separation allow 
service providers to offer both full set of functionality and part of functionality to service 
consumers according to service level agreements. The reliability covers various aspects of 
cloud computing. The base line of the reliability is to provide functioning services. 
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However, the cloud providers cannot guarantee 100% reliability. For example, Amazon’s 
data center in northern Virginia was down because of power outage [2]. This incident is 
caused by a weather condition. There is another service outage happened in October 2012, 
which is caused by a hardware failure. The failure event happened in a single server, and 
was propagated to the entire system through a chain of software and hardware events. If 
there is a mechanism, which could monitor servers to prevent this kind of situation, the 
service providers should be able to provide more reliable services. 
Individual services and integrated services face different issues in cloud computing 
environment. The scalability of services in integrated services is different from single 
services. For example, communication and dependency may need extra resources for 
integrated services. In order to ensure the reliability of integrated services, every 
component in an integrated service not only has to perform proper function but also can 
cooperate with each other. In order to ensure cooperation among different services, 
configuration and management policies from different services must be analyzed and 
enforced according to service level agreements. Policy analysis is a must during this service 
integration process. 
Each service may reside or be deployed in one or more virtual machines. The status 
of virtual machines reflects the status of running services. The reliability of virtual 
machines is an essential component for service reliability. When virtual machines are down 
for any reason, services running on these virtual machines are down. A case worth learning 
is Heroku [3]. Heroku is a PaaS for Ruby programming. At the time of service outage, 
there are about 44,000 running applications in its services. Heroku runs its service on 
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Amazon’s EC2 instances. This lesson taught Heroku that separating its services into 
different availability zone is so crucial for its reliability. 
In a virtualized environment, virtual machines created in one physical machine 
share resources in this physical machine under service level agreements. Virtual machines 
acquire their required resources from the shared physical machine. Although every virtual 
machine is independent for users, the entire physical environment is integrated. When users 
utilize virtual machines or services, resources are usually allocated through virtual machine 
monitors or hypervisors. Virtual machine monitors do not only allocate resources but also 
keep track of execution status for virtual machines. System events in virtual machines can 
be system calls, errors, software failures or system critical failures. Errors and failures are 
critical events. System critical events may affect the health of virtual machines. Sometimes, 
system critical events may also affect the reliability of the entire virtualized environment. 
When one virtual machine crashes, physical machine needs computing and storage 
resources to restore the crashed one. Restore processes do need extra resources other than 
running a stable virtual machine. In order to increase the reliability of virtual machines, 
there must be very effective mechanisms in cloud systems to either avoid system failures 
and faults or adjust systems so that more serious failures and faults can be prevented. 
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1.2 Potential Contributions of the Proposed Research 
I developed an autonomous agent architecture using knowledge-augmented 
temporal logic and filtered-multi dimension neural network for improvement of reliability 
of cloud services. The knowledge-augmented temporal logic utilizes semantic extension to 
analyze dynamic attributes of entities and dynamic relationships between entities. The 
semantic extension provides knowledge supplements for logical reasoning. The temporal 
logic filter is implemented in the neural network framework to select sufficient attributes 
as input of hidden neurons. A novel reverse pattern tree data structure is also developed. 
The reverse pattern tree provides efficient insertion, search and compression functions for 
event pattern learning and recognitions. The filtered-multi dimension neural network 
provides more accuracy on multi-feature sequential event pattern predictions.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 Reliability in the Cloud 
In large distributed systems, such as cloud computing systems, reliability is one of 
key characteristics in both system design and implementation. Cloud computing 
incorporates the computation ability of distributed systems and ease access of the Internet. 
Characteristics of cloud computing include service oriented, loose coupling, strong fault 
tolerant, business model, ease use, TCP/IP based, high security, and virtualization [4]. The 
fault tolerance is one of the most important features for cloud computing. The lack of error 
and fault handling coverage has been shown to be a drastic limit to dependability 
improvement [28]. Reliability of cloud computing depends on the ability of fault tolerance 
[27]. Services running in cloud usually run for weeks or even longer. During the runtime, 
there may be faults or errors happen in systems. If there is any fault happens, failure 
transactions usually will be roll back. Because there is almost no dependency between two 
transactions in cloud computing, failure transactions will not affect other transactions. 
Faults in cloud computing can be categorized as provider-inner faults, provider-
across faults, provider-user faults, and user-across faults [4]. If a fault happens in provider 
side and services are not urgent, this provider may restart services or start back-up services. 
If services are urgent or critical, the fault prevention is more important than fault recovery. 
When a fault occurs among providers, the transaction will be cancelled and return an error. 
The transaction will be redirected to other providers through load balancer. This type of 
faults does not occur very frequently. Between providers and users, the situation is more 
7	
	
complicated. There are so many factors can cause faults, such as network failure, browser 
crush, request time out or hacker attacks. When users are facing these types of faults, they 
usually resubmit their requests. However, if there is any key element involved in faults or 
errors, additional action may be needed to deal with system logs. If there is anomaly 
behavior occurred in faulted nodes, these nodes may need extra attention from cloud 
system protection and security point of view. Through the cloud platform, users not only 
connect with service providers but also share resources and activities with other users. In 
this situation, users manage their own critical resources. Unsafe security management 
configurations may cause unsafe access to critical resources. This is a critical issue in cloud 
computing systems. Service providers need to provide such functionality to help users to 
analyze their configurations. 
Faults can also classified into categorizes according to features of faults [5]. Certain 
faults are caused by natural phenomena without human participation. This type of faults is 
natural faults, such as production defects. Natural faults also include internal and external 
faults. Internal faults are due to natural processes that cause physical deterioration. External 
faults are due to natural processes that originate outside the system boundaries and cause 
physical interference by penetrating the hardware boundary of the system or by entering 
via use interfaces. Other faults are all human-made faults. Human-made faults include 
malicious faults and nonmalicious faults. Malicious faults occur in either system 
development process or during directly use of system. Both of these types of malicious 
faults are with object to cause harm to the system. Nonmalicious faults are without 
malicious objectives. Nonmalicious faults can be further categorized into two classes: 
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nondeliberate faults and deliberate faults. Nondeliberate nonmalicious faults are due to 
mistakes occurs in the entire software life cycle. Developers, operators, maintainers can 
make mistake in any time. This type of faults is hard to prevent. Deliberate nonmalicious 
faults are caused by wrong or bad decisions. These bad decisions are made either 
accidentally or intended. Intended bad decisions are made because of lack of professional 
competence. Therefore, nonmalicious faults also fit into two types: accidental faults and 
incompetence faults. Malicious faults are created to fulfill malicious users’ objectives. 
Malicious faults are categorized into two classes: malicious logic faults and intrusion 
attempts. Malicious logic faults can occur during the development processes, such as 
Trojan horses and logic bombs, and operation processes, such as viruses and worms. 
Intrusion attempts are performed by malicious users, who try to access confidential 
information or get unauthorized rights during the operation processes. Intrusion attempts 
can be logical and physical. In order to prevent and avoid system faults in cloud computing 
systems, above information is useful to clarify system design objectives. 
Correct service is delivered when the service implements system functions [5]. A 
service failure is an event that causes delivered service cannot provide correct service. A 
service failure is a transition from correct service to incorrect service. Authors in [5] also 
categorized system failures into different categories: domain, detectability, consistency, 
and consequences. In domain category, failures contain content failure, early timing failure, 
late time failure, halt failure, and erratic failure. Every type of failures focuses on different 
aspects of system abnormal behaviors. In order to prevent system failures, we may need a 
unified framework for most of these types of system failures. 
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In traditional software reliability engineering, there are four main approaches to 
build a reliable software system. These four approaches are fault prevention, fault removal 
[30], fault tolerant, and fault forecasting [29]. However, in cloud computing environment, 
large-scale complex cloud applications only accept fault-prevention techniques and fault-
removal techniques to develop fault-free software systems [7]. In paper [7], authors present 
a cloud application component ranking framework to build fault-tolerant cloud 
applications. The large scale cloud applications involve large number of components. 
Failures of these components affect reliability of cloud applications directly. The idea of 
presented framework in this paper is to find most reliable critical components in order to 
build reliable cloud applications. Based on the 80-20 rules, authors identify that the 
reliability of software system can greatly increase by eliminate small part of faults in the 
most important cloud application components. The paper also presents two ranking 
algorithms to identify significant components from the huge amount of cloud components 
and an optimal fault-tolerance strategy selection algorithm. Fault tolerance can increase the 
overall system reliability of cloud applications. One way to improve system reliability is 
to employ reliable components that provide equivalent functions to tolerate component 
failures. The redundantly devices, which help to maintain system functionality in the 
presence of failures, provide additional performance in their absence. In such situations, it 
is therefore necessary to employ metrics that take into account both system performance 
and reliability [26]. In order to tolerate faults by using redundant components, there are 
three well-known fault-tolerance strategies. The first one is Recovery Block [8]. Recovery 
Block is structure of redundant program blocks, where secondary blocks is activated when 
primary blocks fails. A recovery block fails only when all redundant blocks fail. The 
10	
	
second strategy is N-version Programming [9]. It is also known as multiversion 
programming, which provides multiple functionally equivalent modules. These modules 
generate result independently. The final result is selected according to majority voting. The 
third strategy is Parallel strategy. Similar to N-version Programming, modules in Parallel 
generate result independently. The first response of all results is selected as the final result. 
Component selection strategies use redundant components to form reliable could 
applications. Under these strategies, service providers need more resources to build 
services, which have lower cost efficiency. The paper [7] also proposes an optimal fault-
tolerance strategy selection algorithm, which calculates the cost, response time, and the 
aggregated failure probability values of different fault-tolerance strategy candidates. The 
output of proposed algorithm is the strategy candidate with best failure probability 
performance. The proposed framework in [7] does not increase the reliability of each 
component of services. However, this framework increases the overall reliability of entire 
service through combinations of redundant service components. The drawback of this 
framework is service providers need more resources to build complete services. And 
furthermore, the more critical components a service has, the more redundant components 
are needed to tolerant faults. 
Most cloud service providers deploy their services in large datacenters. All of 
services are running in virtual machines that reside in physical machines. There are usually 
multiple virtual machines running in one physical machine. When a virtual machine is 
initialized, the administrator or virtual machine monitoring system gets resources from a 
resource pool to build requested virtual machine [10]. In the paper [11], authors provide a 
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discussion on parametric sensitive analysis of availability of virtualized servers. The result 
of this analysis shows that host failures are the most important factors that affect mean time 
to failure of a virtual machine subsystem. Furthermore, the failure rate of applications is 
the major concern of capacity oriented availability. Both mean time to failure of virtual 
machine subsystems and capacity oriented availability are considered as a part of reliability 
of entire virtual system in a virtualized environment. 
Reliability is the proper functioning of the system under the full range of conditions 
experienced in the field. In order to increase the reliability of systems, there must be some 
mechanisms in systems can either avoid the system failures and faults or adjust systems to 
prevent the more serious failures and faults. Of cause, there is no system can ensure 100% 
reliability. System faults always happen in the entire computer systems, including cloud 
computing systems. There are researchers study architecture-based reliability prediction 
techniques, in order to increase reliability of computer systems [31, 32, 33, and 34]. The 
architecture-based reliability prediction tries to increase the reliability in the architecture 
design stage. In architecture-based reliability prediction design, the system usage profile 
modeling is one of approaches.  
System usage can be described in terms of the expected sequences of system calls, 
which may influence the control flow throughout the system. In most of existing 
approaches, the system usage profile is encoded into transition probabilities between the 
states or scenarios of the system model [36, 37]. In [35], authors present a reliability 
modeling and prediction technique that considers the relevant architectural factors of 
software systems by explicitly modeling the system usage profile and execution 
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environment and automatically deriving component usage profiles. The transition 
probability is hard to get in the architecture design stage. However, it is easy to get 
statistical data in the runtime. And the system event logs record most of system events that 
include system fault related events. We can trace system faults through system event logs. 
There are always system critical events happened before system enter fault states. 
Therefore, if a system could predict system critical events, it can predict system faults 
before they really happen. Researchers dig into this problem from different aspects. 
Following study presents several techniques for system fault monitoring. 
Some approaches are implemented with hardware support, such as [12]. Authors 
present a virtual lockstep implementation, which is software based, yet capable of using 
existing hardware features to enhance performance and fault detection capabilities. By 
modifying the KVM hypervisor to support virtual lockstep, the error detection is enhanced 
by verifying the state of the virtual processor at the deterministic VM exit boundaries. The 
replica virtual machine is used to accept the same inputs as the original virtual machine 
and provide out for error detection. The replica virtual machine maintains the same CPU 
state as the original virtual machine. Errors are detected by comparing both the outputs 
generated and the input types, which indicate calculation errors or significant divergences 
in execution. The experiment results show the virtual lockstep model introduces some 
runtime performance overhead to the system. The overhead rate is various based on the 
specific workload of virtual machines. The error detection of this virtual lockstep model 
only focuses on the fault execution of instructions in virtual machines, which ignores other 
errors and faults, such as errors of the instructions and application faults. 
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Some approaches focus on software and operating system level [13, 14, 38]. 
Authors of the paper [13] present a progress monitoring-based fault detection mechanism 
to detect and recover the driver VM from faults to enhance the reliability of the whole 
system. In hypervisor Xen architecture, an isolated driver model is introduced for I/O 
device virtualization. An isolated driver domain (IDD) is a special purpose guest domain 
for directly handling of I/O device accesses. In this reliability enhanced Xen, all the 
requests of guest domains are forwarded to their corresponding IDDs. The IDD is build 
based on commodity operating system, such as Linux. Therefore, failure happened in the 
I/O device driver will not affect the entire system. In order to detect faults and errors, 
authors also present a detection module called Driver VM Monitor (DVM), which 
periodically detects the fault states of IDDs. The DVM is reside in the hypervisor and gets 
support from the virtual device drivers. When the fault detection function is invoked, the 
DVM logs the information of the I/O ring and physical IRQ (PIRQ). An I/O ring is a 
circular queue data structure containing descriptor information, is used to communicate 
between the front-end and back-end drivers. Front-end drivers are drivers reside in the 
VMs. Back-end drivers reside in IDDs and communicate with native device drivers. DVM 
mainly refers the I/O ring pointer information for fault decision, and the PIRQ is used for 
a more detailed inspection. If there is a fault occurred in an IDD, a recovery mechanism, 
called Driver VM Handoff (DVH), transparently redirects I/O requests and responses of 
the fault IDD to another IDD. The proposed monitoring module and recovery mechanism 
provide a fault detection and recovery on isolated device drivers. 
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Haibing et al. [14] introduce an Event-Based Polling model (sEBP), which uses 
existing system events to trigger a regular packet polling such that network interrupts are 
eliminated from the critical I/O paths in the virtual environment. In the sEBP architecture, 
events are retrieved by an event collector. An event manager is used to throttle the number 
of effective events out of the event poll. The event manager consists of three sub modules: 
rate controller, compensating timer, and cross-VM event sharing. The proposed model can 
be implemented in either guest OS in Virtual machine or hypervisor. The sEBP guest OS 
implementation collects system events in the guest VM. Another implementation, which 
sEBP is built in the hypervisor, collects VM_EXITs from various VMs as events. These 
two implementation methods fulfill two different administration goals. 
 Traditional techniques, such as heartbeat [43], have been frequently used to check 
the aliveness of physical and virtual machines. Statistical learning methods are also used 
to detect the system fault, such as [15, 16, 44, and 45]. Authors in [15] present a fault 
detection framework for virtualized environments. This framework consists of two phases: 
a training phase and a detecting phase. The training phase use historical data to train a 
Bayes classifier. The train data is collect from multiple levels of virtualized environments. 
In the second phase, the trained model is used to detect runtime system faults. In such 
virtualized environment, different levels generate different system faults. The proposed 
framework concentrates on three levels; application server level, operation system level, 
and virtual machine monitor level. The application server level is also considered as the 
virtual machine level. In [15], the application server level extractor is a filter resides in the 
application to collect application behaviors. The OS level extractor monitors OS events 
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and faults. The VMM level extractor collects adjustment events of virtual machines. 
Authors utilize the Bayes classifier on features that are extracted from multiple levels. The 
trained model is used in prediction, which is not mentioned in the paper. 
Authors in [16] detect aging phenomenon by conducting experiments in physical 
and virtual machines and identify the differences between the two, and propose a feature 
code-based methodology for failure prediction through system call. The aging problem is 
caused by a large number of repeated executions. Authors also define aging rate as the 
metric of decreasing trend which quantifies the variation of system resource usage. The 
proposed prototype is implemented in the VMM layer to predict the rejuvenation time. 
2.2 Temporal Logic and Policy Analysis 
Temporal logics have experienced rapid development in recent years. Various 
properties for temporal logics’ complexity and axiomatizations are studied [18, 19 and 20]. 
Logical expression capability makes temporal logic a good tool for system specification 
and verification. Recently, temporal logics are used more in reasoning and planning as well 
[21, 22, and 23], especially in policy specification reasoning and analysis [24]. In 
distributed environments, one entity may carry multiple attributes and these attributes can 
have different definitions in different domains. The complexity of an information domain 
becomes a barrier for specification and verification of policies. There are two major 
categories of temporal logics that can be used to analyze temporal attributes. One is liner-
time temporal logics; the other is branching-time temporal logics. In the first category [25 
and 46], information is represented as constraints. In [25], authors implement a Dynamic 
Linear Temporal Logic (DLTL) to specify and verify systems with communicating agents 
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and interaction protocols. Semantic facts of agent communication are specified by means 
of rules and constraints. In [46], authors describe a logical framework for Temporal Action 
Logic (TAL) that specifies and verifies interacting systems. This framework provides a 
simple formalization of communicative actions in terms of their effects and preconditions 
and the specification of an interaction protocol by means of temporal constraints. Another 
temporal logic [47] achieves effectiveness and simplicity through reduction of information 
from information domains. Authors present an A-LTL that inherits some properties from 
Liner-time Temporal Logic (LTL), including constraints. Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) 
[48, 49] is another linear temporal logic working over finite time intervals. The 
Propositional Interval Temporal Logic (PITL) [50, 51] is an extended Interval Temporal 
Logic, which considers semantic information through past operators. However, if some 
information elements cannot be expressed by logic operators, the accuracy of reasoning 
may be compromised. In [52], a Fuzzy Temporal Logic is proposed. The fuzzy temporal 
constraints are used for simple cases, where constraints are composed in a single interval. 
Constraints usually play as a supplement to logical reasoning, which contains limiting 
conditions from an information domain. Borrowing from this idea, I propose a semantic 
extension as an addition to temporal logic so that hidden and implicit relationships can be 
expressed and incorporated in temporal analysis. Meanwhile, a balanced point of time 
complexity and space complexity can be achieved through proper usage of this semantic 
extension. 
Research in policy conflict analysis has attracted growing interest recently as 
autonomous and automatic system management has become popular. Dynamic policy 
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analysis also has started to be studied recently. Logic languages [53, 54] are widely used 
in this field. Temporal logic is widely used in different types of policy analysis frameworks. 
For example, First-order Temporal Policy-analysis Logic (FTPL) [53] is used to check 
whether a SPKI policy state satisfies a property specified in FTPL. This property check can 
be applied to static properties and static policies, which is insufficient for collaboration 
activities. In [54], Event Calculus is implemented in a logic-based policy analysis 
framework to represent and perform reasoning about inconstant properties of a domain 
regulated by policies. However, this framework can only statically analyze policies when 
it monitors runtime policies. Other policy analysis mechanisms [55, 48, and 56] also focus 
on static conflict analysis.  
Dynamic policy analysis is growing in recent years. In [17], authors present an 
approach implemented in their DiffServ QoS management platform to analyze policy 
conflict through Event Calculus. They argue that application-specific conflicts are dynamic 
and can only be determined at run-time, because such conflicts depend upon current status 
of the system. They also illustrate several types of potential conflicts that may arise in 
dynamic resource management for QoS support. An event-driven conflict detection 
mechanism is introduced in [58], which uses a conflict database to store all possible 
conflicts. If there is an event that may cause a conflict, this mechanism will check 
corresponding database entries. These dynamic conflict analysis mechanisms can monitor 
policy sets during run-time, but they cannot trace implicit attributes in policies and dynamic 
relationships among these attributes. In [59], authors use a set of conflict-related Boolean 
rules to verify policies in order to discover and resolve IPSec policy conflicts. In [60], 
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authors propose a unified model to represent and encode QoS policies for efficient conflict 
analysis. In [61], authors propose a logical reasoning framework for policy analysis in 
mobile social network. This framework focuses on the analysis of geological location 
information, which also changes over time. However, it cannot analyze policies from other 
domains with other types of dynamic information. So I propose a general framework that 
can be applied to most types of dynamic policy analysis.  
Meanwhile, logical agents have been studied for decades and implemented in many 
different research fields. In [62], authors present an agent-based conceptual and 
computational model of consumer decision-making based on culture, personality and 
human needs. These needs are supplied in a knowledge base to drive the consumer toward 
a specific product. In [63], authors present an Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) as a viable 
tool to account for the interaction of local and environmental factors to determine 
organizational success. Again, a comprehensive knowledge base is constructed to help 
decision-making. In [64], authors describe an analysis and simulation of meta-reasoning 
processes using an agent architecture for strategic reasoning in naval planning. In these 
papers, a knowledge-augmented logical agent can not only make decisions but also perform 
logical reasoning and data analysis to support decision-making. Therefore, I will also 
incorporate knowledge into logical reasoning and a knowledge base into our policy 
analysis framework to help process implicit attributes and relationships. 
2.3 Event Learning and Prediction 
System event monitoring collects statistical data of system events. Through 
machine learning techniques, we can find some patterns that always appear when system 
19	
	
faults occur. Statistical data is used in mining and detecting fault patterns, [39, 40, 41, and 
42,] mined multivariate time series by recognizing them as weighted graphs to monitor the 
graph sequences for failure detection. System critical event prevention is possible through 
prediction of system critical event. If there is a high possibility of system critical events, 
cloud computing systems can try to avoid system critical events. There are a lot of event 
pattern learning and prediction frameworks. But Agrawal and Srikant proposed the first 
sequential pattern mining problem in 1995 [57]. Agrawal also presents an Apriori-based 
method which is Generalized Sequential Pattern algorithm (GSP) in [82]. The GSP 
algorithm screens all length-1 candidates in the database. Those sequences with support 
less than the minimum support are filtered out. Then the algorithm screens the database 
length-k times to collect support count for each candidate and generates candidate length-
(k+1) sequences from length-k frequent sequences using Apriori. GSP algorithm generates 
a huge set of candidate sequences in multiple database scans which is inefficient for large 
databases. 
Cloud computing platforms provide various services, such as infrastructure as a 
service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), software as a service (SaaS) and etc. Most of 
these services are managed through configurations and policies. When a user tries to use 
two services at the same time, user’s activities have to fulfill both requirements to be 
accepted. Conflicts happen during collaboration of services, integration of services and 
separation of services. Conflicts of policies or other management requirements prevent 
services to provide correct functionalities to users. Furthermore, services may provide 
wrong result for users according to conflicted management policies. Therefore, 
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management policy conflict elimination is one aspect of maintain reliability of cloud 
computing platform. In order to prevent conflicts in these scenarios, conflict analysis 
techniques have been studied. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH PLAN OVERVIEW 
3.1 An Autonomous Agent Architecture for Reliability  
In cloud computing, service providers always want to provide reliable services to 
customers or service consumers. However, there are obstacles between service providers 
and consumers. Customers need customized services with various configurations, these 
customizations and configurations make service providers hard to control the stability of 
their service, especially from different management domains. Configuration in services are 
usually expressed as configuration policies. Therefore, Conflicts between service providers 
and consumers is one obstacle that affects the reliability of services in cloud computing 
environment. 
One of them is policy conflicts when consumers try to integrate multiple services from 
different domains. When services from one provider may not fulfill consumers’ needs, 
Service consumers have to integrate multiple services from multiple service providers, who 
are in different management domains. These service providers set up their own policies 
including management policies, control policies, privacy policies, security policies, etc. 
Policies from different service providers may not compatible with each other. Therefore, 
we need a policy analysis mechanism to find out incompatible parts of policies during the 
service integration. In the agent architecture, knowledge base will contain different domain 
information and the mapping relation of domain objects.  
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Another obstacle is how to detect abnormal events and predict them during the service 
collaboration. In cloud computing environment, although each virtual machine or service 
is independent for users, the entire physical environment is integrated. When users are 
using services that are running on virtual machines or virtual servers, resources are usually 
allocated through the virtual machine monitors. Virtual machine monitors do not only 
allocate resources but also monitor status of virtual machines and system events of virtual 
machines. System events in virtual machines are system calls, errors, or failures. These 
system critical events reflect the status of virtual machines. Sometimes, these system events 
also affect the reliability of entire virtualized environment. When one virtual machine 
crashes, physical machine needs computing power and storage resource to restore crashed 
virtual machine. The restore process does need extra resources rather than running a stable 
virtual machine. In order to increase the reliability during the integration, there must be a 
mechanism to predict system critical events and prevent them. This mechanism can be 
implemented into an agent architecture to fulfill needs of autonomous and efficiency.  
To overcome these obstacles, I designed an autonomous agent framework (Figure 1), 
which is a customized agent architecture including policy analysis and service critical event 
prediction for cloud computing services. This framework monitors service status through 
service control policy monitoring and service event monitoring. Control policies and 
service event logs are normalized according to domain information in knowledge base. 
Policy and event analysis is done by inference engine. Knowledge base contains policy 
model and event pattern statistical information. This framework also provides suggestions 
according to the result of analysis. Following sections describe major components in this 
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framework. Chapter 4 discusses the policy monitoring and analysis components. Chapter 
5 discusses the non-intrusion Log processing components.  
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Figure 3.1. Autonomous Agent Architecture for Reliability Monitoring 
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CHAPTER 4: SERVICE POLICY ANALYSIS 
4.1 Policy Modeling 
4.1.1 General Policy Model 
Service collaboration is a clear trend for cloud applications and services over the 
Internet. Guarantee for Quality of Service (QoS) is an important yet difficult task to 
accomplish among collaborating applications and services. However, different services 
have different control and management requirements. When customers try to use multiple 
services, the control requirements have to be consistent. For example, a real-time HD video 
service requires a large bandwidth for any synchronization or collaboration, and a 
messaging service requires low delay and secure transmission for collaboration. These two 
services may need to be integrated and work concurrently in a multimedia application. In 
order to manage complex requirements between multiple services and service consumers, 
policy-based management can be applied and these requirements can be represented in 
policies. Policy-based management is an administrative approach to manage system usage 
and its governance rules within an information domain. More and more systems have 
adopted this policy-based management approach. In a collaborating services environment, 
a policy domain (domain hereafter) is a collection of elements and services administered 
in a coordinated fashion [1]. 
Collaborating services can support interactions and coordination between service 
providers and individual services, as well as service providers and service consumers. 
Different service providers can share their resources and build new services based on 
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existing services. For example, in Figure 4.1.a, domain A contains two services: financial 
service A and data service D. Service A requires data service D to provide enough 
throughputs. Another domain B contains two services: message processing service B and 
data service D. Service B needs data service D to respond to every request within a certain 
time limit. 
Domai n BDomai n A
Servi ce A
Dat a 
Servi ce D
Servi ce B
Dat a 
Servi ce D
Domai n BDomai n A
Servi ce A
Dat a 
Servi ce D
Servi ce B
a b  
Figure 4.1 Service in Different Domain 
When these two domains collaborate, they share the same data service D (as illustrated 
Figure 4.1.b). At this point, data service D has two policies from service A and service B 
respectively. However, different management requirements from these two services are 
reflected in different policies in a policy-based management environment. These 
requirements may conflict with each other. These conflicts of requirements are usually 
reflected in policy rule conflicts. For example, before domain A and domain B collaborate, 
they have their own policies to control services and have their own data services. I call the 
policy in domain A “Policy 1”, and the policy in domain B “Policy 2”. In “Policy 1”, data 
service D has to provide enough throughputs for service A and the maximum throughput 
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is 2MB/s. This maximum throughput value is adjustable according to the number of page 
views in service A. In “Policy 2”, data service D has to respond to any request from service 
B within 100 time units (0.1 second). Page view on service A is a dynamic and hidden 
factor, which affects requirements from service A. Before collaboration, data service D 
provides certain throughput for service A only. Therefore, service D can use all of its 
capacity to serve A. 
In a policy-based management system, a policy is a statement that describes what 
entities can do and how these actions can be performed. In other words, a policy describes 
several actions and information about these actions. For each action, there is an executor 
or a type of executors, a target or a type of targets, and certain constraints, which constrain 
and describe certain aspects of the action. Each executor or target is represented by a set of 
attributes. An attribute is a characteristic of an entity. In most policy languages, users can 
define very comprehensive policies containing different actions and their constraints. 
Although one policy is enforced as an entirety, it can be decomposed into policy segments 
for analysis. I assume that one segment describes one complete action with one executor, 
one target, and its context (in the form of constraints). Therefore, a policy segment is 
represented as a tetrad (Executor, Target, Action, and Context). Previously, a policy model 
for collaborative services is introduced in [70]. That model is used to represent policies 
formally. There is no domain information in that policy model, which makes policies 
independent with their domains. However, in the policy analysis, we have to incorporate 
domain information into the analysis process.  Therefore, I extend the policy model to make 
it more general and make it having a dynamic capability. 
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Definition 1: Attribute (α) is a piece of information representing a characteristic of an 
entity. For example: A user’s ID number is an attribute. 
Definition 2: Entity (E) is a collection of attributes describing a complete element in 
an information domain. E={α1,a2,a3… an}; 
This set of attributes may be independent or interrelated. An entity can also be a set of 
entities. I use capital letters to represent entities. A user is an entity in an information 
domain; a file is also an entity in an information domain. 
Definition 3: Relationship (R) is represented by a predicate of the Cartesian product 
of two entities: R=P(E×E’). 
If R is a relationship between entity A and D, then R is a predicate of A×D. P() is a 
predicate. The value of R represents whether the relationship holds. The Cartesian product 
of A and D is the set of all ordered pair (val(α), val(β)), where α ∈A AND β∈D, and val(α) 
and val(β) are corresponding values of a and β. The value of predicate P is determined by 
selected pairs (val(α), val(β)) in the entire ordered pair set. For example, if attributes a and 
β contain two numerical values, the relationship R is hold when val(α)=val(β) is hold. The 
relationship is Equal of two numerical values. 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝛼 × 𝛽 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝛼, 𝛽 𝛼 ∈ 𝐴 ∧ 𝛽 ∈ 𝐷 ∧ 𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝛼 = 𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝛽  
Definition 4: Action is a function on a relationship between related entities with 
constraints. An action is denoted as action(R,{x}). 
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In an action, the input is a relationship between two entities and constraints effective 
on the relationship. The output is an altered relationship. The symbol R represents a 
relationship between two entities. The symbol {x} is a constraint set for this action. This 
constraint set {x} contains zero or more constraints. Different actions concentrate on 
different relationships of between entities. For example, action() is an action that A can 
change the value of attribute β of entity D. It is represented as action(R,{x}). The 
relationship R between A and D indicates there is one attribute a of entity A is equal to one 
attribute β of entity D (R=Equal(A×D)). The constraint x is the value range of attribute a. 
When this action is performed, the entity A changes the value of its attribute a within the 
range that constraint x states. In order to maintain the true value of relationship R, the 
attribute β also needs to be changed to the new value of attribute a. 
Definition 5: Executor is the source entity of an action, which is the E in the 
corresponding relationship. E=Executor={α}. Attributes in an Executor entity initiates 
changes to break relationships. 
Definition 6 Target is the recipient entity of an action, which is the E’  in the 
corresponding relationship. E’=Target={α}; Attributes in a Target entity respond to 
changes to maintain the relationship. 
Definition 7: Constraint is restrictive information or conditions on entities and actions. 
Constraints of a policy usually include restrictive information or conditions from the 
system environments or policies. The constraint restricts the executor, target, and/or action. 
In this policy model, I separate the constraints into two types: one type of constraints 
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restricts actions, and another type of constraints restricts entities. I consider the second part 
of constraints as a part of the Context. 
Definition 8: Context in a policy segment includes constraints on entities and 
environmental constraints. 
A policy segment describes a single action, which contains only one executor, target, 
action, and context. In each policy segment, an action represents a function on a 
relationship between its executor and target. Therefore, actions work on mappings of 
attributes between executors and targets, which are legitimate entities in a policy domain. 
Executors and targets consist of sets of attributes. 
Definition 9: Policy Segment is the smallest functional policy unit in a policy. A 
segment is a tetrad: Segment= (Executor, Target, Action(R,{x}), Context). 
The above definitions are common knowledge. I define them in order to formally 
present a policy in the following sections. 
4.1.2 Policy Representation Using Temporal Logic 
“The primary feature of a logic theory is its order, which defines the domain of all 
formulae described by the logic.” [64]. Propositional logic is based on a set of elementary 
facts connected by a set of logical operators. It indicates a Boolean value set. First-order 
logic [71] is an extension of propositional logic. Temporal logic assumes that facts hold at 
particular time periods, or before or after certain time points, and these time periods and 
points are ordered [72]. In order to incorporate the domain information with the policy 
analysis, I proposed a semantic extension to the temporal logic. So implicit relationships 
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and other hidden information can be expressed and incorporated in the temporal analysis. 
I can use temporal logic to express policies. The described policies in the previous section 
can be expressed as the following logical expressions. 
“Policy 1” can be expressed as: 
{𝐴, 𝐷, 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡 Θ, 𝛼 , [𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝐴, 𝐷, 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡 Θ, 𝛼= 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝐴 ∈ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴 ∧ 𝐷 ∈ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴 ∧ 𝛼 < 2000𝐾𝐵/𝑠]} 
 In this logical expression, A is the executor; D is the target; requestthroughput(R, 
α) is the action that executor A performs on target D; Θ is the relationship between executor 
service A and target service D; α is the number that A needs to request. In this policy, the 
relationship Θ means there are two attributes in A and D is equal to each other  
[𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡(𝐴, 𝐷, 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡(Θ, 𝛼)) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝐴 ∈ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴 ∧ 𝐷∈ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴 ∧ 1000𝐾𝐵/𝑠𝛼 < 2000𝐾𝐵/𝑠] 
is the context within “Policy 1”. Predicate permit(A,D,requestthroughput(Θ, α))  is true 
when A is allowed to perform action requestthroughput(Θ, α) on D. Context information 
is placed in square brackets “[]”. According to “Policy 1”, if service A and data service D 
both belong to “DomainA”, when service A needs more bandwidth, service A can request 
certain amount of throughput denoted as a from data service D for itself (α must be smaller 
than 2000KB/s). 
“ Policy 2” can be expressed as: 
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{𝐵, 𝐷, 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 Φ, 100 , [𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝐵, 𝐷, 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 Φ, 100= 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝐵 ∈ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐵 ∧ 𝐷 ∈ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐵 ∧ (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒N < 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒O)]} 
 Here, B is the executor; D is the target. The executor service B can perform action 
requiredresponsetime(Φ,100) on the target service D. This action is used to set the response 
time requirement in service D. Because the parameter in this action is a constant value, this 
action reflects that the requirement of service B always stays at 100 milliseconds. The 
relationship Φ represents Response_time in D has to be smaller than the response time 
requirement from B.  
[𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝐵, 𝐷, 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 Φ, 100 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝐵 ∈ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐵 ∧ 𝐷∈ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐵 ∧ (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒N < 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒O)] 
is the constraint in “Policy 2”. In this policy, there is only one response time requirement 
between service B and data service D. According to this policy, the response time 
requirement is a fixed value. In other words, unless data service D cannot provide response 
within the required time limit, there is no violation against with this policy. The required 
response time is denoted as ResponseB; the response time in data service D is denoted as 
ResponseD. Service B cannot change the response time setting in data service D. Predicate 
permit() evaluates whether executor B can perform action requiredresponsetime(Φ,100)on 
target D. 
In the above logical expressions, there is no time or time-dependent information on 
executors, targets, actions or constraints. If there is time-dependent information in a policy, 
it is difficult to be represented by first-order logic only. For example, in a situation such as 
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“service A is using data service D”, the term “using” is the critical part, which expresses 
the action being preformed. Temporal logic can be used to represent time-dependent 
situations. It has been broadly used to cover temporal information in many logical analysis 
methods. As an extension of first-order logic, temporal logic can also express policies. 
Temporal logic adds time elements into expressions without changing the semantics. Then, 
the two policy examples can be expressed as follows. 
Policy 1: 
{𝐴, 𝐷, 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡(Θ, 𝛼), [𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠𝐴𝑡(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡(𝐴, 𝐷, 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡(Θ, 𝛼)), 𝑡)= 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝐴 ∈ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴 ∧ 𝐷 ∈ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴 ∧ 1000𝐾𝐵/𝑠 < 𝛼 < 2000𝐾𝐵/𝑠]} 
 Time information is added to “Policy 1”. This is a constraint that does not affect 
the format of the general policy model. The time information becomes another dimension 
that is denoted as t in logical expression. In this expression, if A and D belong to DomainA 
at time t and 1,000KB/s<α<2,000KB/s, the predicate permit() holds true. Figure 2 (a) 
illustrates the range of throughput that can be requested by A. 
Policy 2: 
{𝐵, 𝐷, 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 Φ, 100 , [𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠𝐴𝑡(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝐵, 𝐷, 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 Φ, 100 , 𝑡)= 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝐵 ∈ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐵 ∧ 𝐷 ∈ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐵 ∧ (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒N < 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒O)]} 
In this expression, if B and D belong to DomainB at time t, the predicate permit() holds 
true. 
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According to the above logical expressions, there is no conflict between these two 
policies. In Figure 4.2(a), D’s throughput for A will change between 1,000KB/s and 
2,000KB/s; in Figure 4.2(b), D’s response time for B will be a constant yet smaller than 
B’s requirement. These two policies are defined on different attributes of data service D.  
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Figure 4.2 Throughput and Response Time for Data Service D 
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Figure 4.3 Relationships between Two Policies over Data Service D 
It seems that there is no conflict between these two policies. However, if I take a closer 
look at the environment of this collaboration, I discover that service A cannot always 
increase its throughput requirement. Otherwise, data service D cannot respond in time to 
service B. Figure 4.3 shows this situation with these two policies. In this diagram, when 
the number of users for service A increases (as shown in Figure 4.3 (c)), the throughput 
requested by service A also increases until the throughput reaches 2,000 KB/s (as shown in 
Figure 4.3(b)). Along with the increase of throughput requirement, data service D has to 
use more resources to support service A. At the same time, data service D cannot avoid 
increasing its response time for service B, because it does not have enough resources for 
service B. As shown in Figure 4.3 (a), at time t, the response time of data service D reaches 
the upper limit of the requirement from service B, but it will still increase. At time t’ the 
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response time has already exceeded the requirement of service D. The conflict between 
these two policies is caused by hidden information. The hidden information does not shown 
in policies explicitly. Therefore, I introduce a semantic extension that contains domain and 
environment information to provide extra support for logical reasoning. 
4.2 Knowledge-Augmented Temporal Logic 
4.2.1 Semantic Extension 
Logical agent is useful in policy conflict analysis, since it can provide automatic and 
autonomous analysis. There are four major components in an agent architecture: inference 
engine, knowledge base, sensor, and actuator. Semantic extension is an extended part of 
the knowledge base. A semantic extension contains attributes, relationships and dynamic 
constraints among attributes and relationships for an information domain. There is not only 
information changing along with others, but also information changing over time. This 
dynamic information imposes complications on logical analysis, and a traditional 
knowledge base is not enough for logical reasoning in policy conflict analysis with 
dynamic attributes and relationships. As a part of information, certain type of attributes 
that changes overtime, I define this type of attributes as dynamic attributes, such as 
temperature, throughput, and response time. The semantic extension provides dynamic 
information and supports logical reasoning. Semantic extension is a formal representation 
of related information abstracted from an information domain, which includes attributes, 
entities, relationships and constraints. Relationship is an important part of a semantic 
extension, which works on a Cartesian product of two entities. 
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If Θ is a relationship between Service A and Data Service D, Θ is a predicate on A×D. 
A represents the set of attributes for Service A; D represents the set of attributes for Data 
Service D. Equal is the predicate. The value of Θ is whether the relationship holds. 
For example, during the collaboration between DomainA and DomainB, A and D have 
a relationship: relationship Θ (A’s throughput requirement equals to D’s throughput 
provided for A); B and D have a relationship: relationship Φ (D’s real response time is less 
than B’s response time requirement). Relationship Θ can be expressed as the following 
form. 
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∈∧∈∧∈∧∈
=×=Θ
 
In this logical expression, relationship Θ is consisted of predicate on two attributes: 
A.requiredthroughput and D.throughput. These two attribute belong to entities A and D 
respectively. In Policy 1, service A can change its throughput requirement, which has to be 
fulfilled by Data Service D. According to this policy, the attribute throughput in D has to 
be equal to the attribute requiredthroughput in A under certain conditions. I use Equal(A×D) 
to represent this requirement from Policy 1. Since the relationship Θ is consisted of a 
predicate over two numeric attributes, there are three situations Equal(A×D), Larger(A×D) 
and Smaller(A×D) between two attributes. Equal(A×D) can be defined as the following 
form: 
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The Equal(A×D) represents a relationship with some constraints between two entities 
A and D. Under constraint A.requiredthroughput=D.throughput, relationship Θ becomes 
the relationship Equal. Constraint of a relationship will be discussed in section 4.2. 
Relationship Φ is between Service B and Data Service D. D should have a smaller 
response time than the requirement from B, which means the required response time from 
B is larger than the response time in D. 
)(
).,_.()(
DomainBDDomainBBiff
ereponsetimDmeresponsetirequiredBLargerDBLarger
∈∧∈
=×=Φ
 
In this logical expression, relationship Φ’s value is also consisted of a predicate over 
two attributes: B.required_responsetime and D.responsetime. In Policy 2, service B has a 
response time requirement, which is a fixed value. This value is the maximum response 
that can be accepted by service B. Therefore, the response time in Data Service D must be 
less than this value. The requirement of this policy can be defined in the following logical 
expression: 
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐵×𝐷= 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠𝐴𝑡 𝐵. 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑. 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒> 𝐷. 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒, 𝑡 		𝑖𝑓𝑓∀𝐵. 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒, 𝐷. 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒|𝐵. 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒∈ 𝐵 ∧ 𝐷. 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑒 ∈ 𝐷 ∧ 𝐵 ∈ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐵 ∧ 𝐷 ∈ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐵 ∧ 𝐵. 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒	> 𝐷. 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 
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The relationship Larger is built on two attributes B.required_responsetime and 
D.responsetime. This relationship is a specific situation of relationship Φ with a constraint. 
Only when the constraint is hold, the relationship Φ is Larger. 
When two relationships Equal and Larger are held, policies can be enforced on A, D 
and B. 
The following temporal logic expressions illustrate A’s attributes to reflect possible 
attribute changes in the above relationships: 
))),.,(,,((
),(
)2000.1000(),.(,
troughputrequiredthAoughputrequestthrDApermitHoldsAt
tEqualHoldsAt
roughputrequiredthAtroughputrequiredthAincreasedtTt
Θ⇒
=Θ⇒
<<∧∧<∀
 
In this logical expression, increased(A.requiredthroughput,t) is a predicate, which 
means attribute A.requiredthroughput is increased at time t. After the increase, the 
A.requiredthroughput is still smaller than 2000. Thus relationship Θ can still be Equal. So 
I should permit the action requestthroughput (Θ,A.requiredthroughput) to increase 
D.throughput. The predicate Permit(A,D, requestthroughput (Θ,A.requiredthroughput))  is 
true when A can perform action requestthroughput (Θ.A.requiredthroughput) on D. 
))),100,(,,((
),(
)100_.()._.(,
tsponsetimerequiredreDBpermitHoldsAt
tLargerHoldsAt
meresponsetirequiredBmeresponsetiDmeresponsetirequiredBtTt
Φ⇒
=Φ⇒
=∧>∧<∀
     In this logical expression, B.required_responsetime is larger than D.responsetime, 
and B.required_responsetime equals to 100. At time t, relationship Φ is Larger. Then at 
time t, the predicate permit(B, D, requiredresponsetime(Φ,100)) can hold. 
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In service collaboration, certain relationships are implied in policies to control 
information and resource sharing. A relationship between two entities is a relationship 
between two attributes or two attribute sets from these two entities. However, certain 
attributes will affect relationships, and some of them will affect relationships indirectly and 
implicitly. So certain constraints need to be established for this type of effects. 
Definition 10: When an attribute affects a relationship and makes it change I call this 
attribute an explicit attribute. Explicit attributes define a set of attributes that can initiate 
certain changes to a relationship. The superscript in a logical expression denotes an explicit 
attribute.  
Definition 11: When an attribute is affected by a relationship, I call this attribute an 
implicit attribute. Implicit attributes define a set of attributes that are derived from this 
relationship, and these attributes are affected by a change to this relationship. Implicit 
attributes are denoted as suffixes. 
For example, ΘA.requiredthroughputD.throughput indicates that if the attribute 
A.requiredthroughput changes, the relationship Θ will not be held. In order to keep this 
relationship, the attribute D. throughput will have to change. If A.requiredthroughput increases, 
in order to keep the relationship, the throughput in D will also need to be increased, and 
the response time in D will have to increase as well. Figure 4.4 shows the difference and 
relationship between explicit and implicit attributes. 
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Figure 4.4 Relationships and Constraints 
In Figure 4.4 (a), if the explicit attribute requiredthroughput changes, this change will 
lead to a change on relationship Θ. For example, relationship Θ changes from Equal (Θ) to 
Larger (Θ’). According to Policy 1, the value of A.requiredthroughput has to be the same 
as the value of D.throughput. In order to hold the requirement of Policy 1, the relationship 
Θ’ has to be changed back to the relationship Θ. The attribute D.throughput has to be 
changed to meet the required value of A.requiredthroughput (as shown in Figure 4.4 (b)). 
The lead arrows in relationship Θ are solid; this means relationship Θ and its explicit and 
implicit attributes are explicitly illustrated in the policy. Attribute D.throughput leads to 
the relationship change on Π and then the relationship Π affects D.responsetime. The arrow 
in relationship Π is dotted lines, which means relationship Π is implicit in policies. 
Relationship Π has a Balance value, which means D.throughput and D.responsetime are 
related. When one falls, the other will rise. Finally, the attribute D.responsetime leads to 
the change of relationship Φ. I use a logical expression to represent explicit and implicit 
attributes, and store them in the semantic extension. Once this logical expression is 
retrieved from the semantic extension in the knowledge base, it can help track these 
attributes’ updates and derived changes. 
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In the above logical expression, if action request(Θ,A.requiredthroughput) holds, and 
the requested throughput is less than 2,000 KB/s, relationship Θ, Π and Φ hold and then 
action request() is permitted. I denote the attribute A.requiredthroughput, which is an 
explicit attribute for relationship Θ, as a superscript and the implicit attribute 
D.responsetime as a suffix. 
4.2.2 Relationship and Entity 
A relationship may not only be affected by attributes but also be affected by constraints. 
In an information domain, relationships connect different entities (e.g. services). Because 
an entity is represented by a set of attributes, relationships also connect different attributes. 
In Figure 4.5, Service A and Service B together with Data Service D have two relationships 
(implied in policies). Service A, B and D have three attributes respectively. Relationship Θ 
connects attribute requiredthroughput in Service A and Data Service D. If there is a 
constraint on attribute requiredthroughput in Service A, relationship Θ will be affected 
only when this constraint (1,000 KB/s< throughput<2,000 KB/s in this case) is satisfied. If 
this constraint changes over time, I call this constraint a “dynamic constraint”. Dynamic 
constraints are very important in an information domain because these constraints usually 
control the connection between different entities. In addition, attribute requiredthroughput 
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is an explicit attribute for relationship Θ, attribute responsetime is an implicit attribute for 
relationship Θ, and attribute responsetime is also an explicit attribute for relationship Φ. 
Therefore, if attribute requiredthroughput changes, it will affect relationship Θ and then 
relationship Θ will affect attribute responsetime. Attribute responsetime will eventually 
affect relationship Φ. If the results of these two changes are inconsistent, there will be a 
conflict (conflict of duty). 
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Figure 4.5 Relationships and Constraints 
Relationships in an information domain are connections between entities, which are 
sets of attributes (as illustrated in Figure 4.5). Therefore, relationships are connections of 
attributes. In Figure 4.6, there is a relationship between attribute requiredthroughput and 
attribute throughput, which can be represented as: 
Θ=Equal(A.requiredthroughput,D.throughput)=true 
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Because this is also a constraint limiting this relationship, I have to consider this 
constraint during logical reasoning related to this relationship. The constraint of this 
relationship is: 
 (1000KB/s<A.requiredthroughput)<2000KB/s)∧(A∈Domain A) ∧(D∈Domain A)  
∧ (A.requiredthroughput∈A,D.throughput∈D). 
If I consider this constraint, the relationship becomes two sub-relationships: Θ’(c) and 
Θ-Θ’(c) (as illustrated in Figure 4.6 b). Θ’(c) represents one sub-relationship that holds 
when constraint c is true or becomes effective. Θ-Θ’(c) represents the other sub-
relationship that is not affected by constraint c. However, in semantic extension, I consider 
these two sub-relationships as one complete relationship, which can be expressed as Θ=(Θ-
Θ’(c))∪Θ’(c). If constraints are not active at certain time or under certain conditions, the 
Θ’(c) sub-relationship will be empty and the relationship Θ will become Θ=(Θ-φ)∪φ=Θ. 
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Figure 4.6 Relationships and Sub-relationships 
In semantic extension, relationships include all temporal logic relationships, such as 
“Earlier than”; and other logical relationships, such as “Equal”, “Larger”, “Smaller”, and 
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“Negative”. The relationships in the knowledge-augmented temporal logic are inherited 
from the temporal logic and propositional logics. 
Constraints on an action restrict attributes and the relationship of this action. In this 
paper, I use symbol Δ to denote this type of constraints. Again, relationship works on a 
Cartesian product of two entities, and can be expressed as 
Θ=Equal(requiredthroughput,throughput), where requiredthroughput and throughput are 
attributes in entities. If there is a constraint c on a relationship, the constrained relationship 
becomes Θ’(Δ)=Equal’(requiredthroughput,throughput,Δ), where Δ is one or a set of 
constraints. In semantic extension, constraints are expressed as predicates that returns 
whether the constraints are satisfied or not. Only when constraints are satisfied, an attribute 
or relationship can change to a certain value.  
A semantic extension abstracts certain information from an information domain. Now 
I can give a definition for semantic extension. 
Definition 12: A semantic extension contains {α},{E},{R},{Δ}, that are, 
correspondingly, the attributes set, entities set, relationships set and constraint sets from 
one information domain. Σ={{α},{E},{R},{Δ}| E⊆{α},E≠∅,R=E×E’}. 
{α}, {E}, {R}, {Δ} are attribute set, entity set, relationship set, constraint sets in a 
information domain. An entity is a sub set of {α}, and entity cannot be empty. A 
relationship works on a Cartesian product of two entities. 
Attributes in an information domain are associated not only with entities in the domain 
but also with attributes describing properties of the domain. These are domain attributes 
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that usually do not constitute entities. However, domain attributes may be added to entities 
under certain circumstances. For example, when two semantic extensions merge together, 
the attribute domain ID may become an attribute of an entity. 
<Entity>
<Class ID=”Data Service D”/>
<Attributes>
 <Attribute ID=”throughput”/>
 <Attribute ID=”responsetime”/>
</Attributes>
</Entity>
<Entity>
<Class ID=” Service A”/>
<Attributes>
    <Attribute 
ID=”requiredthroughput”/>
</Attributes>
</Entity>
<Entity>
<Class ID=”Service B”/>
<Attributes>
<Attribute 
ID=”required_responsetime”/>
</Attributes>
</Entity>
 
Figure 4.7 Example of an Entity in the Knowledge Base 
The Figure 4.7 shows examples of entities in the knowledge base. The diagram shows 
each entity has its own attributes, which is expressed in XML format in the lower forms. 
In these examples, an entity includes a class ID and a set of attributes. A relationship 
includes an ID that is the name of this relationship. A relationship also includes two entities: 
one Executor and one Target. In an Executor, there is an attribute that involves in this 
relationship. In the relationship Equal, there is a constraint in an attribute of the Target. 
This constraint limits the maximum value of the attribute throughput of entity Data Service 
D. In another example, the relationship Larger has two entities: Service B and Data Service 
D. There is a constraint attached to the Service B, which limits the maximum of 
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required_responsetime of Service B. In original knowledge base, entities and attributes are 
well presented. The Semantic Extension focuses on relationships and constraints. Each 
relationship contains constraints in its attributes.  
In the Figure 4.8, each relationship has two entities: Executor and Target. Each entity 
is consisted with a set of attributes. In this example, the diagram only shows attributes that 
involved in the relationship. There are two attributes in Executor and Target respectively 
in relationship Equal. The attribute requiredthroughput has a property on its value. This 
property is Adjustable, which indicates the Executor can change this attributes to any value 
that smaller than the constrained value 2MB/s. The attribute throughput in Target has a 
property that is Variable. This property indicates this attribute will be changed according 
to environment. The operator in this relationship is Equal or =. This operator is used to 
perform validation of whether this relationship is hold. This example presents if and only 
if A.requiredthroughput is equal to D.throughput, and the A.requiredthroughput<2MB/s, 
the relationship Equal is hold. The second example presents if and only if 
B.required_responsetime is larger than D.responsetime and B.required_responsetime is set 
to 100ms, the relationship Larger is hold. In these two relationships, there are dynamic 
attributes, such as D.throughput and D.responsetime. This information is stored in the 
semantic extension. 
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<Relationship ID=Larger>
  < Executor ID=”ServiceB”>
<Attribute ID=”required_responsetime” >
<Value type= Constant>
100ms
</Value>
</Attribute>
  </Executor>
  <Target ID=”ServiceD”>
<Attribute ID=”repsonsetime”/>
<Value type= Variable/>
  </Target>
  <Operator>Larger</Operator>
</Relationship>
<Relationship ID=Equal>
  < Executor ID=“ServiceA”>
<Attribute ID=“requiredthroughput”>
 <Constraint ID=“Max”>2MB/s</Constaint>
  <Value property=Adjustable type= Variable/>
</Attribute>
  </Executor>
  <Target ID=“ServiceD”>
<Attribute ID=“throughput”>
   <Value type= Variable/>
</Attribute>
  </Target>
  <Operator>Equal</Operator>
</Relationship>
 Figure 4.8 Examples of Relationships in the Semantic Extension 
In Equal relationship, there is an arrow from Service A’s attribute requiredthroughput 
point to Data Service D’s attribute throughput. The origin attribute of this relationship is 
requiredthroughput, which is the superscript of the relationship in logic formulae. The 
relationship is the predicate of Cartesian product of two entities. To maintain a relationship 
between two entities is to maintain the truth value of the predicate. In the relationship Equal, 
the value of two attributes requiredthroughput and throughput from two different entities 
are the same. Because the attribute requiredthroughput is adjustable by users, when the 
value of requiredthroughput changes, the value of predicate Equal will not be hold as true. 
In order to maintain the truth value of predicate Equal, the value of another attribute 
throughput in Data Service D has to change. In this process, reason of truth value of 
predicate Equal changes is the change of attribute requiredthroughput. In a relationship, 
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the attribute that leads the change of truth value of predicate is the superscript of this 
relationship. The attribute that cover the change to maintain the truth value of the predicate 
is the subscript of this relationship. In Figure 4.8, the attribute throughput is the one that 
changes to maintain the truth value of the predicate Equal. The Equal relationship is 
expressed as: EqualA.requiredthroughputD.throughput. In Larger relationship, the attribute 
responsetime is dynamic and affected by the attribute throughput in the same entity. When 
Data Service D provides too much throughput for Service A, Data Service D may increase 
its response time to Service B. Therefore, the truth value of predicate of Larger relationship 
cannot be hold. In order to maintain this relationship, the attribute required_responsetime 
supposes to increase as well. However, this attribute is a constant that cannot change 
according to environment. Therefore, the attribute required_responsetime is still subscript 
of Larger relationship. The Larger relationship is expressed as 
LargerB.required_responsetimeD.responsetime. 
Domain ontology is a conceptualization for an information domain, which also 
provides a formal way to represent domain information. Information in semantic extension 
is extracted from one domain, so I use ontology to express and store domain information 
in a semantic extension. Usually I use one semantic extension to represent one information 
domain. One knowledge base can contain one or more semantic extensions, which depends 
upon the scope of this knowledge base. In a semantic extension, relationships are associated 
with corresponding attributes. When constraints on these relationships are satisfied, 
changes of individual attributes will affect relationships. Since certain constraints will 
change over time, I use temporal logic to represent these dynamic constraints. 
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For example (as illustrated in Figure 4.5), relationship Θ, which connects services A, 
B and D, has one explicit attribute requiredthroughput in service A and one implicit 
attribute throughput in Data Service D. And there is a constraint Δ on requiredthroughput 
and Θ. Relationship Φ connects one attribute required_responsetime in service B and one 
attribute responsetime in Data Service D. And there is a constraint Δ’  on 
required_responsetime and responsetime in relationship Φ. Relationship Π connects 
attributes throughput and responsetime in Data Service D. When constraints are satisfied, 
requiredthroughput will affect Θ and throughput in Data Service D. And this change is 
transferred through relationship Π and will further affect responsetime in Data Service D. 
Then the change of responsetime will change the relationship Φ. This situation can be 
represented as the following rule: 
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In this logical expression, constraints Δ and Δ’ hold after time T. Therefore, after time T, if 
explicit attribute requiredthroughput in service A changes, implicit attribute throughput in 
Data Service D will change; attribute response_time in Data Service D will change because 
of relationship Π; attribute response_time in Data Service D will further affect relationship 
Φ. 
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4.3 Rules in Conflict Analysis and Conflict Reconciliation: 
In conflict analysis, I usually assume the executor of an action is an entity, and the 
target of an action is another entity. There are three major categories of conflicts: (1) 
conflict of duty, (2) conflict of interest, and (3) different executors perform different actions 
on a single target, and the outcome of each action is incongruent with each other. To 
represent these conflict types, let us consider the following elements in the general policy 
model. Executor S has an attribute χ, which is an explicit attribute for relationship Θ. There 
is also an implicit attribute i in executor S. Attribute i is an explicit attribute for relationship 
Φ. Target O has an attribute υ and an attribute j. Relationship Θ connects attribute χ and υ. 
Relationship Φ connects attribute i and j. In the following conflict analysis rules, 
relationship Κ and Λ indicate two actions respectively. There are two constraints δ and ω 
restricting Θ and Φ. Κ and Λ are two actions between S and O. Relationship Θ belongs to 
action Κ, and Φ belongs to action Λ. 
Conflict of duty: Κ and Λ are two actions between S and O. They contain relationship Θ 
and Φ respectively. If their explicit attributes change, these two actions cannot be 
performed at the same time: 
)'),,(),,((
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When action Κ is performed, attribute χ changes, then the implicit attribute i will also 
change. However, action Λ is performed at the same time, so attribute i has to change too. 
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These two changes cannot happen at the same point in time. Thus a conflict of duty happens. 
When two actions cause a conflict, there is one action has higher priority, such as action 
K(S,O). The system should allow K(S,O) instead of action Λ(S,O). Reconciliation rule for 
this type of conflict is shown as follow: 
)))),,(,,()),,(,,(((
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Conflict of interest: Κ is an action between S and O, and Λ is an action between S and O’. 
There is a relationship Θ between S and O. There is another relationship Φ between S and 
O’. The constraint δ constrains the attribute i in entity O, while attribute j in entity O’ 
cannot change at the same time. 
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 When action Κ is performed, attribute χ will change, and the implicit attribute i will 
also change. At the same time, if action Λ is performed, attribute υ and attribute j both will 
change. There will be a conflict according to the constraint δ. If one of these actions has 
higher priority than another action, this action will be granted and another action will be 
denied but the system. This reconciliation rule is shown as follow: 
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Different executors perform different actions on a single target, and the outcome of 
each action is incongruent with each other:  
Κ is an action between S and O, and Λ is an action between S’ and O. There is a 
relationship Θ between S and O. There is another relationship Φ between S’ and O. In this 
case, relationship Θ connects attribute χ in entity S and attribute i in entity O; relationship 
Φ connects attribute υ in entity S’ and attribute i in entity O. When attribute χ and υ change, 
these two actions cannot be performed at the same time. 
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When action Κ is performed, attribute χ will change, and implicit attribute i will also 
change. At the same time, if action Λ is performed, attribute υ and attribute i in entity O 
will also change. Thus, this type of conflict occurs. If these is an action has higher priority, 
this action is permitted by the system, and the low priority action will be denied. The 
reconciliation rule is shown as follow: 
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4.4 Experiment of Policy Conflict Analysis Component 
In the web services case, I have two types of policies (access control policies and 
quality of service policies). Both are included in our experiment policy sets. For the 
experiment, two policy sets are established. One policy set only contains static conflicts 
(the static policy set). Another policy set contains conflicts that are caused by dynamic 
attributes and dynamic relationships (the dynamic policy set). In the static policy set, 
required information for analysis is static and is contained in the policies themselves. So 
during the analysis process, temporal logic does not need additional information since static 
conflicts are not caused by dynamic attributes or relationships. Each policy set contains 
100 policy segment pairs. In these 100 pairs, there are 45 and 57 conflicts in two policy 
sets respectively. I also implement three other conflict analysis algorithms and compare 
their results with those generate from our knowledge-augmented temporal logic approach, 
as well as with the result from a human domain expert’s manual investigation. In Table 4.1, 
under column “Static Policy Set” and “Dynamic Policy Set”, there are three elements in 
each row. In each three-element tuple, the first element is the number of conflicts found by 
that approach; the second element is the total number of conflicts in the policy set, and the 
third number is the total policy segment pairs in the policy set. 
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 Static Policy Set 
 Detected Conflict Policy Conflict Policy Segment 
Event-driven model[58] 45 45 100 
IPCDR [59] 45 45 100 
Temporal Logic 45 45 100 
Result of TL with Semantic 
Extension 
45 45 100 
Human 43 45 100 
 Dynamic Policy Set 
 Detected Conflict Policy Conflict Policy Segment 
Event-driven model[58] 30 57 100 
IPCDR [59] 30 57 100 
Temporal Logic 30 57 100 
Result of TL with Semantic 
Extension 
55 57 100 
Human 35 57 100 
Table 4.1 Comparison of Different Policy Conflict Analysis Algorithms (A) 
In this experiment, Event-driven model [58] and IPCDR [59] focus on the policies 
themselves without policy domain information. These algorithms can analyze policies with 
explicit attributes only. If there are changes in a relationship and implicit attributes, these 
algorithms cannot detect conflicts accurately, because they do not consider domain 
information during its analysis process. In the experiment on dynamic policy set, results 
show that temporal logic integrated with semantic extension has a much better accuracy 
than that of pure temporal logic. In the analysis process, semantic extension provides 
dynamic attribute and relationship information to supplement temporal logic rules. This 
extra information helps our system identify entities and build constraints on different 
attributes and relationships. For the dynamic policy set, temporal logic finds 30 policy 
conflicts caused by dynamic attributes. Actually, more conflicts rooted 27 from dynamic 
relationships and dynamic constraints on relationships. These conflicts are detected by 
temporal logic with semantic extension. At the end of the experiment, I also ask a system 
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administrator who has the knowledge of web services and web service policy to analyze 
these two policy sets manually. As shown in Table 4.1, most conflicts in static policy sets 
are identified by this human expert. However, for the dynamic policy set, only 35 conflicts 
are found by this human expert. Although a human expert can incorporate environment 
information into policy analysis, the complexity of the environment information is still the 
major obstacle in manual analysis. The result of manual analysis heavily depends upon the 
analyzer’s experience. Therefore, I clearly see that without a proper knowledge base, 
dynamic conflicts are hard to detect. Semantic extension can provide such information for 
logical analysis, and the analysis engine can handle very complex situation. The entire 
framework can provide recommendation for subsequent reconciliation with a proper 
knowledge base. 
In the sensor system case, I choose three sets of policies (A, B, C). The policies in 
these sets come from two different sensor systems. I collect these policies before these two 
sensor systems start collaboration. 30 policies are from one sensor system, and the other 
30 are from the other. There are 20 policy pairs in each set. There are 15 static conflicts in 
set A, 16 dynamic conflicts in set B, and 13 dynamic conflicts in set C. Conflicts in policy 
set B are dynamic conflicts, but there is no hidden relationships, explicit attribute or 
implicit attribute involved in any conflict. Conflicts in policy set C are also dynamic 
conflicts, but certain hidden relationships, explicit and implicit attributes are involved. The 
analysis result is shown in Table 4.2. In this table, under column “Policy Set A”, “Policy 
Set B” and “Policy Set C”, there are three elements in each row as well. The numbers in 
each row have the same meaning as in Table 4.1.  
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 Policy Set A Policy Set B Policy Set C 
 Detected 
Conflict 
Policy 
Conflict 
Policy 
Segment 
Detected 
Conflict 
Policy 
Conflict 
Policy 
Segment 
Detected 
Conflict 
Policy 
Conflict 
Policy 
Segmen
t 
Event-driven 
model[58] 
15 15 20 16 16 20 10 13 20 
IPCDR[59] 15 15 20 15 16 20 8 13 20 
Result of TL 15 15 20 16 16 20 8 13 20 
Result of TL 
with Semantic 
Extension 
15 15 20 16 16 20 13 13 20 
Table 4.2 Comparison of Different Policy Conflict Analysis Algorithms (B) 
In this experiment, three policy sets contain different levels of conflict. In set A and B, 
all algorithms provide similar results. However, in the Policy Set C, IPCDR and Temporal 
logic can only find 8 out of 13 conflicts. These 8 conflicts have either entity or action 
overlaps in their corresponding policies. If there are changes of relationships connecting 
entity or relationship attributes with environment attributes, the lack of knowledge support 
will result in a low accuracy of analysis result. 
 
 
  
57	
	
CHAPTER 5 NON-INTRUSIVE LOG PROCESSING  
5.1 Service Event Pattern Learning  
5.1.1 Event Pattern Learning Technique Survey  
In a cloud computing environment, services are deployed in number of virtual 
machines. Service events are collected from all involved virtual machines. Service events 
contain service status information, service run-time variables, virtual machine status 
information and other service related data. Most services provide functions to collect 
service events and create service event logs. Through these service event logs, I can learn 
the behavior of services and their environment. Pattern learning techniques can help 
analyze service event logs to find service event patterns. Each service event pattern 
indicates one possible path that service state changes from a normal state to a critical state. 
Service events can be categorized into different event levels, such as hardware events, 
system level events, software events, maintenance events, etc. In order to detect critical 
event pattern and predict critical events, pattern learning and prediction algorithms are must 
in the service event monitoring component. 
Sequential event pattern learning has been studied for decades [65, 66, 67, 68, 69 and 
73], which is a good candidate mechanism for cloud system event detection and prediction. 
In [57], Agrawal discusses an Apriori-based pattern learning method called Generalized 
Sequential Pattern algorithm (GSP). This GSP algorithm screens all length-1 candidates in 
a database. Those sequences with a support that is less than the minimum support are 
filtered out. Then the algorithm screens the database k times to collect support count for 
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each length-k candidate and generates length-(k+1) candidate sequences from length-k 
frequent sequences using Apriori. GSP algorithm generates a huge set of candidate 
sequences in multiple database scans, which is inefficient for large databases. In [74], 
authors use a level-wise association-rule algorithm to exploit anti-monotone and monotone 
constraints so that the problem’s level-wise dimensions can be reduced. Each transaction, 
before being added to the support count, is reduced as much as possible, and only if it 
survives this phase, it will be used to count towards the support for candidate item sets. 
Each transaction, which can arrive this counting phase at iteration k, is then reduced again 
as much as possible; and only if it survives this second set of reduction, it will be written 
to the transaction database for the next iteration. Artificial neural network is another family 
of learning and prediction mechanisms that utilizes neuron functions to provide outputs 
based on a large number of inputs. However, artificial neural network alone may be 
difficult to satisfy the close to real-time requirement for cloud system reliability 
management. So certain adjustment and improvement together with other auxiliary 
mechanisms are necessary. For event prediction, two principal approaches to critical event 
prediction based on previous occurrences of failure can be determined. One is estimation 
of the probability distribution of a random variable for the time to next failure. The other 
type of approach builds its estimation based on the co-occurrence of two or more critical 
events [75].  
Furthermore, authors of [77] suggest that the behavior of individual services in a 
service process must be monitored in order to settle any responsibility issue and to meet 
the overall quality requirements from its consumers. To provide a solution, they suggest 
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any under-performed service should be replaced immediately to ensure the required level 
of service quality. It is true that quality requirements and under-performed services are the 
imperatives for SOA. However, without a clear definition of quality requirements for 
services, the motivation of this solution seems obscure. Also, “by using which standards a 
recovery application can be invoked to start healing mechanism” is still a question in these 
two papers. Similar issues also arise in cloud computing systems. For instance, in the 
RESERVOIR architecture [76], a service manager is responsible for monitoring the 
deployed services and adjusting their capacity. At the same time, the service manager also 
needs to take care of the number of Visual Execution Environment (VEE) instances as well 
as their resource allocation to ensure SLA compliance and alignment with high-level 
business goals. Although this article mentions adjusting service capability and resource 
allocation, there is not a set of explicit requirements of quality defined for services, 
especially for a multi-tenant environment. For another instance, Roy Campbell, etc. [75] 
propose a cloud computing test-bed to create unified and coherent resources, rather than 
several completely separated clusters that provide reliable functionalities. Although, in 
their Open Cirrus service stack, the lowest level service is based on a notion of physical 
resource set (PRS), there is still no mechanism to provide any monitoring and recording 
functionalities for tracking the existence of system resources. In [69], authors present a 
BIDE (BI-Directional Extension) algorithm that is adopted to learn event patterns from 
service event stream. This BIDE algorithm mines frequent close patterns in a given event 
dataset and prunes irrelevant pattern branches more quickly so that the search space 
becomes deeper by using the BackScan pruning method. 
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5.1.2 Hash Table with Reversed Frequent Pattern Tree 
One most important feature or advantage of Hash table is the search speed, which is a 
constant time. A good hash function can greatly reduce search time in hash table search. In 
previous section, I summarize the BIDE algorithm which mines the event sequence 
database and find out all frequent closed patterns. It consists of Forward-checking, 
Backward-checking and BackScan pruning methods. This algorithm constructs a complete 
set of frequent closed pattern in an event sequence database, and a frequent closed pattern 
tree. During the real-time pattern learning process, the frequent pattern tree will change, 
when new pattern are found. And new frequent patterns are not closed, so the frequent 
pattern tree is not a closed frequent pattern tree anymore. However, during the learning 
process, I still try to compress the pattern tree to reduce the memory consumption. When 
the hash occupancy rate reaches a certain number, the rehash function is triggered. The 
rehash function hashes all existed node into a new larger hash table. The hash occupancy 
rate is set according to previous experience. 
In the traditional tree structure, parent nodes are connected with children nodes 
through links. However, in our approach, there is only one link from one parent node to its 
first child node. This child node is also connected with other children node through sibling 
links. The Figure 5.1 shows a structure of a node. Child node pointer points to its first child 
node; Sibling Node pointer points to its next sibling node; Parent node pointer points to its 
parent node; Next node pointer points to next node in the linked list. In following 
presentation, figures only show links that related to their topics. 
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Figure 5.1 Structure of a Node 
Because children nodes contain a pointer that points to their parent nodes, I call it a 
reversed tree. The Figure 5.2 illustrates an example of a reversed pattern tree. In this figure, 
only parent node links are shown. Although there is no directed link from parent nodes to 
every child node, because of nature of pattern stream, from node “A” to node “AB” I can 
simply grow the node “A” with an event “B”.  If there is an “AB” node exists in the tree, I 
can increase its statistic information; otherwise, I can create a new node with its parent 
node pointer points to node “A”. 
Φ
A B C
AA AB AC BB CA CC  
Figure 5.2 Reversed Frequent Pattern Tree 
There is another problem that I cannot find a path from the root to any leaf node in the 
reversed pattern tree. In order to solve this problem, each node is stored in a linked list 
node, and there is a hash table that stores indexes and pointers that point to every node in 
reversed pattern tree. An entry in this hash table contains an index that calculated by a hash 
function, and a pointer points to a linked list node. A linked list node contains event pattern 
name and statistic information like support. A linked list node also has two pointers. One 
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pointer point to next linked list; and another pointer point to its parent node in the reversed 
pattern tree. So a linked list node can be presented as {pattern, next node pointer, parent 
node pointer}. The Figure 5.3 illustrates a reversed pattern tree using linked list node. 
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Figure 5.3 Reversed Pattern Tree using linked list node 
These linked list nodes also connected through their first pointer. Then I have a linked 
list L (shown in Figure 5.4). This linked list contains all patterns in the system. When a 
new pattern appears, the system calculates an index for this pattern, creates a linked list 
node and sets the pointer in the corresponding hash table entry to the new linked list node. 
Then the new linked list node is added to the end of the linked list L. If there is a collision, 
the new linked list node will be inserted into the linked list L at the position after nodes 
that have the same index. The collision linked list is also a part of the linked list L, for 
example, the nodes “AA”, “AB” and “AC” are in the same collision linked list. The max 
length is also a parameter to trigger the rehash function.  
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Figure 5.4 Example of Hash Table and Linked List 
The Figure 5.4 shows a visualized example of Hash table T and linked list L. If the 
pattern “AC” is a new frequent pattern, the algorithm calculates the index for “AC”. In this 
example, I assume the pattern “AA”, “AB” and “AC” have the same index value, and “AA” 
and “AB” already exist in the linked list L. The algorithm finds the linked list node “AA” 
according to the hash table index “4”, and checks the index of linked list node “AB”, which 
is connected with node “AA”. The index of node “AB” is equal to the index of new pattern 
“AC”. Then the algorithm checks the index of node “BB”, which is connected with node 
“AB”. Because the index of node “BB” is not equal to the index of new pattern, the 
algorithm inserts the new pattern “AC” between linked list node “AB” and node “BB” as 
shown in the Figure 5.4. 
In order to increase the search speed of finding a leaf node for a given node, each node 
has two more pointers that link parent node and children nodes. A node in the reversed 
frequent pattern tree has a child pointer, which points to one of its children nodes. This 
pointer is used to travel from parent node to children nodes (dotted line). Another pointer 
in a node is sibling pointer, which points to next sibling node. The child pointer and sibling 
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build a path from parent node to all children nodes (dash-dot line). The Figure 5.5 shows a 
reversed frequent pattern tree with child pointers and sibling pointers.  
Φ
A B C
AA AB AC BB CA CC
 
Figure 5.5 Reversed Pattern Tree with Child Pointers and Sibling Pointers 
The Figure 5.6 illustrates the algorithm to insert a new frequent pattern into the Hash 
Table T and the linked list L. The algorithm first exams whether there is a hit in the hash 
table according to the calculated index of new pattern. If the corresponding table entry is 
null, then the algorithm checks whether the new pattern meets the minimum support 
thresholds. If the new pattern fulfills the requirement of minimum support thresholds, 
create a new linked list node N and add this linked list node to the end of the linked list L. 
Then the algorithm set the parent pointer of the new node to its parent node. If it is not null 
in the corresponding hash table entry, the algorithm exam whether there is a node for the 
input pattern already exists. If the input pattern is a new frequent patter, create a new linked 
list node, insert the node to the linked list L, and return the index of new frequent pattern.  
Any event pattern should have one parent node. The parent node contains a pattern 
that is a sub-string of current pattern. The length of parent pattern is not necessary to be 
current pattern length-1. The length of parent pattern can be shorter, because some patterns 
may be merged with its children during the compress process. 
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Figure 5.6 New Frequent Pattern Insertion Algorithm 
Along with the online running of the system, the number of nodes in the linked list 
will become bigger and bigger, in order to save space and increase search speed, I have to 
compress the reversed pattern tree. In order to compress the reversed pattern tree in a real-
time, each leaf node checks its support and its parent node’s support. If its support equal to 
its parent node’s support, I can merge the leaf node and its parent node. If there are different 
supports, I do not merge leaf and its parent nodes. Because the real-time online learning 
and recognition have a very sensitive time requirement, the compress process only take 
place when there are enough CPU idle time. The Figure 5.7 illustrates the Reversed 
New Frequent Pattern Insertion Algorithm 
FrequentPattern_Insertion(HashTable T, Linked_List L, Event Pattern P, min_sup) 
Input:  a Hash Table T;  
a Linked_List L that stores event pattern P, a minimum support threshold min_sup) 
Output:  index of Event pattern P in Hash Table T 
1: index=Hashi(P); 
2: if T[index] is empty 
3:{ if P.support > min_sup; 
4:  { 
5:  create a linked list node N; 
6:  store P in N; 
7:  add N to the end of Linked List L; 
8:  call Parent_Index(N); 
9: } 
10: else 
11: return null;} 
12:else 
13:{ 
14:  if Pattern P is already in L 
15:  update the statistic of exist node; 
16: else 
17:     create a linked list node N; 
18: get the linked list node M from the hash table entry pointer; 
19: create a temporary node Temp=M.next; 
19:     if linked list node Temp is not null: 
20:                  Insert N before the node Temp; 
22:             call Parent_Index(N); 
23: return index;} 
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Frequent Pattern Tree compress algorithm. The algorithm first checks whether the current 
has a parent node. If there is a parent node and the support of parent node is equal to support 
of current node, current node will set its parent node pointer to its parent’s parent. And 
remove current node’s parent node. This process is called recursively. 
If a node in an event sequence tree has the same support with its parent node, this node 
is the only child node of its parent node. In order to prove this statement, I assume event 
sequence S is the parent node of event sequence S’. The event sequence S’ can be expressed 
as S+Q. Q is the remainder event sequence in S’. Every time S’ appears, the S+Q appears. 
When support of S’ increase, the support of S will also increase. If there is another child 
node of S appears, the support of S will also increase by this child node. Therefore, if the 
support of S is equal to the support of S’, the event sequence S’ is the only child node of 
event sequence S. 
The collision chain in the hash table is related with the hash function. In the experiment 
section, I use FNV algorithm to calculate the index for each event pattern string. FNV is a 
non-cryptographic hash algorithm. The length of collision chain is a criterion for rehashing 
function. Another criterion is the hash occupancy ratio. When one of these criteria meets 
the threshold, the system is ready to start rehash function. The rehash function will not 
immediately, but it will start when the system has some ideal CPU cycle. 
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Figure 5.7 Reversed Frequent Pattern Tree Compress Algorithm 
 
	  
Compress_Tree(Linked_List L) 
Input: a linked list L that contains all frequent patterns; 
Output: a compressed Linked list; 
1: linked_list_node N=L.firstnode; 
2: loop: 
3:         CheckParentNode(N); 
4:         if Node.next!=NULL; 
5:   Node=Node.next; 
6:       else 
7:   return; 
 
CheckParentNode(Linked_List_Node N) 
Input: a linked list node N; 
Output: NULL; 
8: if N.parent is not NULL 
9:  if (N.support == N.parent.support) 
10:     Compress N and N.parent node 
11:     Remove(N) 
12:      CheckParentNode(N); 
 
Remove (Linked_List_Node N) 
Input: a linked list node N; 
Output: null; 
13: If N.Child!=NULL 
14:     Pointer Temp=N.child; 
15:     Loop: 
16:      Move N’s children nodes to child node list of N’s Parent node. 
17: If N.Parent.Child!=N 
18:     Pointer Temp= N.Parent.Child; 
19:     Loop: 
20: if Temp.Sibling!=N&Temp.Sibling!=Null 
21:      Temp=Temp.Sibling; 
22: else 
23:      Temp.Sibling=N.Sibling; 
24: Remove node N from the N.next list; 
 
68	
	
5.2 Event Pattern Detection 
System event pattern recognition is the second step of critical event prediction. In this 
step, I have to read an event sequences, and search frequent pattern database that try to find 
out a matched frequent pattern. If there is a matched frequent pattern, I also have to update 
the statistical data for further recognition and prediction. 
In a hash table, to search an existed item, I can use hash function to directly calculate 
the index of this item. If the hash table entry with this index contains this item, it will report 
a match. If there is not a match in this step, I have to consider two situations. One situation 
is that the hash table entry of this index is empty, which means there is no such item can 
match given data item. Another situation is that there is a linked list in this hash table entry. 
If the given pattern can match any item in this linked list, I also can report a match. If there 
is no match in the linked list, I will report an unmatched notification. 
If the given event sequence can be found in the hash table, which means this event 
sequence is a frequent closed pattern. And this item can be found in the event sequence 
tree. I will update the statistical data of this event pattern. The Figure 5.8 shows an example 
of a process of recognition. In this example I have an event sequence “AC”, the index of 
“AC” is 4. The pointer of index 4 is pointing to pattern “AA”, which is not the target pattern. 
Then I will try the next node in the linked list. The next node is “AB”, which has the same 
index. Because the “AB” is not the target pattern, I will continue to next node that contains 
pattern “AC”. The pattern “AC” is the target pattern, and it will be return as a hit. If the 
target pattern does not exist in the pattern list, a NULL will be return. For example, if the 
index of an event sequence “AD” is 4, which will lead to the pattern “AA”. After I traverse 
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from “AA” to “AC”, the next node is pattern “BB”, which has an index 6. When I traverse 
to “BB”, I can return a non hit for current entry of hash table. This means there is no match 
pattern for event sequence “AD”. 
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Figure 5.8 Event Sequence Recognition Example 
During the recognition process, if a new frequent event pattern is discovered, it will be 
inserted into the reversed hash pattern tree using the insertion algorithm. Under some 
condition, an event pattern will be inserted as a child node of its parent node, such as pattern 
“AB” and pattern “A”. If there is a pattern already exists in as a child node of pattern “A”, 
for example pattern “ABC”. The pattern “AB” and pattern “ABC” will be the children 
nodes of pattern “A” at the same time. However, during the insertion process, the insertion 
algorithm checks whether there are potential children nodes for inserted pattern. If there 
are potential children nodes, according to the insertion algorithm, these children nodes will 
be moved under the inserted pattern node. 
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5.3 Event Pattern Prediction Algorithm 
5.3.1 Filtered-Multi Dimensions Neural Network  
The information in service event log represents running status of a service. In event 
sequences, each event contains a set of system attributes. Events can be categorized into 
number of event types or event levels according to attribute types and value of attributes 
within events. Events in the same type or level usually contain the same or similar set of 
attributes. Attribute set of an event sequence is the union set of attribute sets of events.  
Sequences of service events are transmission processes of this union attribute set. In the 
meanwhile, attributes in an event have different severities. Some attributes represent event 
types, and some attributes represent the location of events. These attributes can be 
organized by their severities. The most important attribute is the primary attribute for an 
event. In pattern prediction process, attributes with higher severity will be used first to 
predict future events. I create several attribute trees to help build prediction model and then 
predict possible event. Each attribute has one corresponding tree. Event patterns can be 
identified by their primary attributes represented by a sequence. For example, an event 
sequence ABC, which A’s attribute set is {a1, a2, a3}, B’s attribute set is {b1, b2, b3}, and 
C’s attribute set is {c1, c2, c3}. Therefore, this event sequence can be presented as <a1, b1, 
c1>. I call this attribute sequence primary attribute sequence. In a primary attribute 
sequence, attributes are primary attributes of events. Figure 3 shows an attribute tree with 
severity. In this attribute tree, only the primary attributes have been considered. According 
to severity, I can build attribute forest to present an event sequences, and these trees can be 
searched or processed parallel. 
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The neural network algorithms can handle time series events and forecast future events. 
The basis function neural networks are a class of neural networks. The base function neural 
networks produce weighted sum of a number of base functions. A wavelet neural network 
(WNN) [79] is an alternative to the classical feed-forward neural network (FFNN) [80] for 
approximating arbitrary nonlinear functions, inspired by both the FFNN and wavelet theory. 
The WNN has been successfully applied into the function learning and time series 
predictions. Wavelet functions include continuous wavelet transform and discrete wavelet 
transform. Since wavelets have shown their excellent performance in nonstationary signal 
analysis and nonlinear function modeling. In the simplest form of wavelet neural network, 
the input and output both have only one variable. The output of this simplest wavelet neural 
network can be defined as: 
𝜓X,Y 𝑢 = 𝜓(Z[YX )	 	 	
λ is the dilation parameter, and t is the translation parameter. And the structure of this 
simple wavelet neural network is shown in Figure 5.9. 
ψ		u Ψλ,t(u)
λ t  
Figure 5.9 A Simple Wavelet Neural Network 
      The n-dimensional wavelet basis function can be calculated by the tensor product 
of 1-Dwavelets. Therefore, the output of all hidden layer neurons (wavelons) will be the 
same and can be written as 
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𝜓X,Y 𝑢 = 𝜓(Z[YX )     
 Attributes of events cannot easily fit in this simple wavelet neural network. Each 
event is a multiple dimensional vector. Therefore, I need to employ a multidimensional 
wavelet neural network. In the multidimensional wavelet neural network, input event 
sequence of the model is considered as a sequence of multidimensional vectors. Figure 
5.10 illustrates an architecture of an attribute-based multidimensional wavelet neural 
network. In the input layer, each input node read an event from event sequence, and pass 
event attribute set into next layer. The filter layer selects attributes base on the severity of 
attributes in an event. The severity information is provided by the knowledge-base of the 
prediction framework. The goal of this layer is to reduce the dimension of the input of 
neural network. The high number of dimensions makes the neural network cannot 
convergent and high time complexity. 
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Figure 5.10 Layers of Filtered MD Wavelet Neural Network 
Each type of system attribute has its own neuron to calculate the influence toward the 
system. Therefore, the second layer of the network extract every attribute and send them 
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into different neuron. The number of filter nodes is predefined according to the maxima 
number of event patterns. The output of filter layer is a set of related attributes of each 
event. This attribute set is defined in the log recording and pattern learning process. In each 
filter node, there is an attribute selector. Attribute selectors are designed for filter layer to 
choose primary attribute set and relation attribute from input event sequences. During the 
network learning process, the selector searches the knowledge base for each input event 
and provides most important attributes. Attribute selectors is also a control model to control 
the number of input dimension of the network. The control logic within attribute selectors 
is predefined and expressed as logical expression. For example, Fan speed is an input 
attribute, which is an integer value, with a normal range from 1000 to 5000. If the value of 
this attribute is out of its range, it indicates either there is some problem with the fan, or 
the system is overheated. When the fan speed is in the normal range, this attribute may not 
be considered as an input to the network. If the fan speed is out of normal range, the fan 
speed is an indicator of some abnormal situations. The logical expression to evaluate this 
attribute is: 
𝐸 𝑡 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒				𝑖𝑓	(𝑡 > 1000	⋀𝑡 < 5000𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒				𝑖𝑓(𝑡 < 1000	⋁	𝑡 > 5000  
This logical expression will determine whether the fan speed attribute will be 
considered in the hidden layer. The input of fan speed is transferred into an indicator that 
affects the result of prediction. Service event sequences are time series data, therefore, the 
temporal logical expression can handle time-related attributes. For example, the fan speed 
is a time-related attribute in an event sequence. This attribute appears in multiple events 
and changes its value in the event sequence. Then I can use temporal logic to express this 
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attribute in different events. Neurons in the first layer calculate the output for next layer 
according to the output of filter layer. The last layer of nodes in the hidden layer is the 
summation layer. Each node in this layer get the sum of previous layer outputs 
In virtualized environment, events come from different virtual machines, and these 
virtual machines consist of different information domains. Therefore, event attributes 
consist of cross-system information. Some attributes contain local node information; some 
attributes contain remote user information; and some attribute contains relationship 
information of current event and future events. This information can help us evaluate which 
attributes should be considered in the learning and prediction process. Events in the same 
pattern has stronger mutual relationship than other events. This relationship is mainly 
reflected by certain attributes. I call this type of attributes relation attributes. The number 
of relation attributes in an event pattern shows the level of interdependency between two 
events. The more relation attributes, the stronger relationship between the events in an 
event pattern. Taking relation attributes into the hidden layer of the WNN is one task of 
filter layer. In order to determine whether an attribute is a relation attribute in an event 
pattern, I use logical rules to evaluate event pattern attribute sets and store the relationship 
attributes in the knowledge base. In the learning and predicting process, the relationship 
attribute is another aspect that to calculate the final output. The temporal logic expressions 
and temporal rules are used in the neural network to filter input of each neuron according 
to time attribute of each events. 
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Because the input of the wavelet neural network in proposed framework is 
multidimensional, the output of the multidimensional wavelet neural network can be 
express as: 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝜔aΨa 𝑥 = 𝜔a 𝑎a [cd𝜓(e[fghg )iajkiajk   
ai is the scale parameter, and bi is the translation parameter.  Ψi is the wavelet activation 
function. 
 The learning process of this neural network establishes the connection of different 
attributes and events. In the learning set, the back propagation method is used in the training 
step. In order to increase the chance of convergence, I setup certain adaptive stopping 
criterion. Since the function computed by this WNN model is differentiable with respect 
to all mentioned unknown parameters, a standard back-propagation (BP) gradient descent 
training algorithm can be used with guided attribute selectors. 
5.4 Experiments 
In our experiment, I collect events from over 20000 event records from a cloud data 
center. The data center consists of a number of high performance computing systems. There 
are various services running in this data center. In order to test the learning and prediction, 
I divide the testing data set into two parts. One part is used for offline learning, the other 
part is used for online prediction.  
Events in this dataset is recorded in time order. Each event contains its application id 
and node id attribute. The application id is used to differential services. One service usually 
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consists of number of nodes. These two attributes indicates the location of events. I divided 
the dataset into two parts, one is for offline learning and another one is for testing. In the 
first half of dataset, there are 8000 event records are used in offline learning, and 2000 
event records are used for tuning the network. The second half are used for test of 
prediction.  
In the experiments, I setup different candidates from the prediction results, and use 
these candidates to verify prediction results. If candidate events happen right after the 
prediction, I consider this prediction is correct. If candidate events do not appear after the 
prediction, I consider this prediction is incorrect. The result shows the number of 
candidates directly affects the accuracy of the prediction. However, larger number of 
candidates will affect the efficiency of prediction. In Figure 5.11, I illustrates the 
comparison of accuracy from wavelet neural network based algorithm and from an average 
one dependency estimator (AODE) based algorithm. The result also shows that the pattern 
library is not stable at the beginning. The pattern library is updated during event processes. 
New patterns are added into the pattern library, and patterns that cannot meet the minimum 
support are removed from the pattern library. The result demonstrates that when pattern 
library becomes stable, relation attributes and structural attributes can help wavelet neural 
network to generate results that are more accurate.  
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Figure 5.11 Prediction Accuracy Comparison of WNN and AODE 
The pattern library is updated during the experiment. Figure 5.12 shows the 
performance of WNN, multi-dimension WNN and Filter multi-dimension WNN with 
different number of hidden nodes. This result shows the multi-dimension has better 
prediction result comparing to WNN algorithm. The filtering layer reduce the complexity 
of input dimension without reducing the accuracy. The severity of attributes can help the 
proposed framework to achieve better performance with high efficiency. 
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Figure 5.12  The performance of WNN, Multi-Dimension WNN (MD-WNN) and 
Filter-Multi-Dimension WNN (Filter MD-WNN) in RMSE for training data set with 
different hidden nodes 
In Figure 5.13, it illustrates the comparison of prediction results of Support Vector 
Machine [81], Ripper[78], MD-WNN, Filter-MD-WNN , and AODE. The average 
precision, and the average recall in Figure 5.13. I use recall and precision to measure the 
effectiveness of our predictors.  
 
Figure 5.13 The average precision and recall of different prediction algorithms 
The cost of time for computer the result, the different network settings and layers have 
outcomes. Comparing with SVM with the similar accuracy, the filter-MD WNN has a 
fewer time cost in the prediction process. The AODE uses the much more time to provide 
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the result. The time cost of Ripper is in between of LIBSVM and Filter-MD WNN. 
Although the MD-WNN has the least time cost, but the accuracy is worse than the Filter-
MD WNN. The Figure 5.14 shows the comparison of the average time cost of different 
prediction algorithms. 
 
Figure 5.14 The average time cost of different prediction algorithms 
5.5 Summary 
In order to predict the cross virtual machine critical events, I proposed a multi-
dimensional wavelet neural network based fast event pattern prediction framework. This 
framework combines features of hash table and reversed pattern tree structure to increase 
the learning and detection speed for real time critical event pattern. The reversed pattern 
tree provides relations between children nodes as well as children nodes and their parent 
nodes. This relation is used in prediction to increase accuracy. An attribute forest is also 
used for parallel detection and prediction processes. Primary attribute lists and secondary 
attribute lists supply additional information to increase the accuracy of prediction. The core 
prediction algorithm utilizes the multi-dimensional wavelet neural network to achieve a 
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balanced result between accuracy and speed. In order to improve the convergence, a filter 
layer is enforced to reduce unnecessary dimensions. Meanwhile, I find that the space 
complexity of real-time critical event pattern detection and prediction can also be reduced 
if a suitable set of wavelet parameters can be found. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
6.1 Conclusion 
I have development customized agent architecture including policy analysis and 
service critical event prediction for cloud computing environment. This framework utilizes 
temporal logic to analyze configuration conflicts and predict potential service critical 
events. I developed knowledge-augmented temporal logic that incorporates semantic 
extension in a knowledge base to enhance logical expression and supplement reasoning 
capability. Experiments confirms the enhanced reasoning capability of this knowledge-
augmented temporal logic and its excellence for multi-domain policy conflict analysis. 
Semantic extensions contain structural information of information domains, which include 
relationships and their related attributes. They provide the ability that I can incorporate 
different information domains without ambiguities. Dynamic relationships with constraints 
increase the accuracy of logic reasoning on changing information. This additional 
information can reduce the ambiguity of elements from different domains and relationships 
among multiple domains, which increases the accuracy of policy conflict analysis. 
Furthermore, semantic extension is flexible and extensible so that it can make collaboration 
and system integration easier. On the other hand, I developed a non-intrusion log-
processing framework that learn and predict service critical events. This framework 
protects the cloud service through service critical event pattern learning and prediction. It 
uses a novel reverse pattern tree to store event sequences of collaborative services, and use 
filtered multi-dimension neural network online predict potential critical events. Therefore, 
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the static configuration policies and run-time service event monitoring are integrated into 
one customized agent architecture. The knowledge base ensures both the accuracy of policy 
analysis and critical event prediction.  
 
6.2 Future Work 
The reliability in cloud computing environment includes many aspects, the availability, 
data retention, real-time migration and other directions. These directions are all worth for 
working on. My future work will focus on using more run-time configuration policy 
analysis and conflict prediction using filtered neural networks in cloud computing 
applications. 
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